Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU Council: a challenge and
  new world record by Kurz, Sascha & Napel, Stefan
ar
X
iv
:1
50
3.
02
85
9v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
0 M
ar 
20
15
DIMENSION OF THE LISBON VOTING RULES IN THE EU COUNCIL: A CHALLENGE
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ABSTRACT. The new voting system of the Council of the European Union cannot be represented as the inter-
section of six or fewer weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This sets a new record for real-world
voting bodies. A heuristic combination of different discrete optimization methods yields a representation as
the intersection of 13 368 weighted games. Determination of the exact dimension is posed as a challenge to the
community. The system’s Boolean dimension is proven to be 3.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a group or committee whose members jointly decide whether to accept or reject a proposal (or,
more generally, any system which outputs 1 if a minimal set of binary conditions are true and 0 otherwise).
The mapping of given configurations of approving members to a collective “yes” (1) or “no” (0) defines
a so-called simple game. It can often be described by a weighted voting rule: each member i gets a non-
negative weight wi; a proposal is accepted iff the weight sum of its supporters meets a given quota q. The
simple game is then known as a weighted game.
Many real-word decision rules can be represented as weighted games, but not all. It is sometimes
necessary to consider the intersection of multiple weighted games, or their union, in order to correctly
delineate all acceptance and rejection configurations. The minimal number of weighted games whose
intersection represents a given simple game is known as its dimension [13]; the corresponding number in
the disjunctive case is its co-dimension [6]. The (co-)dimension of a rule which involves finitely many
decision makers is finite, but can grow exponentially in the group size [14, Thm. 1.7.5]. It is NP-hard to
determine the exact dimension of a given game [3].
Taylor [12] remarked in 1995 that he did not know of any real-world voting system of dimension 3 or
higher. Amendment of the Canadian constitution [9] and the US federal legislative system [13] are classical
examples of dimension 2. More recently, systems of dimension 3 have been adopted by the Legislative
Council of Hong Kong [2] and the Council of the European Union (EU Council) under its Treaty of Nice
rules [5]: until late 2014, each EU member implicitly wielded a 3-dimensional vector-valued weight and
proposals were accepted iff their supporters met a 3-dimensional quota. Real-world cases with dimension 4
or more, however, have not been discovered yet (at least to our knowledge). This suggests that determining
the dimension of a given simple game might be a hard problem in theory but not in practice.
We establish that the situation is changed by the new voting rules of the EU Council, which were
agreed to apply from Nov. 2014 on in the Treaty of Lisbon (with a transition period). They involve a dual
majority requirement where (i) at least 55% of the EU member states need to support a motion and (ii)
these supporters shall represent at least 65% of the total EU population. However, (iii) the “no”-votes of at
least four EU member states are needed in order to block a proposal. A coalition of the 25 smallest among
the 28 EU members fails to meet provision (ii) but is still winning due to (iii). We show that representing
these rules as the union of one weighted game with the intersection of two more involves no redundancy,
even for moderate changes of the current populations. So the Boolean dimension (see Def. 1) of (i)–(iii) is
3, and robustly so. Restricting representations to pure intersections or pure unions, however, increases the
minimal number of weighted constituent games significantly.
We can prove that the dimension of the EU28’s new voting rules is an integer between 7 and 13 368; its
co-dimension lies above 2000. This makes the EU28 a new record holder among real-world institutions.
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The determination of the exact dimension of voting rules in the EU Council is an open computational
challenge, which we here wish to present to a wider audience. It is related to the classical set covering
problem in combinatorics and computer science.
The EU voting rules aside, the paper provides a general algorithmic approach for determining the di-
mension of simple games. We combine combinatorial and algebraic techniques, exact and heuristic opti-
mization methods in ways that are open to other applications and further refinements. This contrasts with
previously mostly tailor-made arguments for specific group decision rules.
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We first introduce notation and some selected results on simple games; [14] is recommended for a detailed
treatment. Given a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players, a simple (voting) game v is a mapping 2N →
{0, 1} from the subsets of N , called coalitions, to {0, 1} (interpreted as a collective “no” and “yes”) which
satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Coalition S ⊆ N is called
winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. If S is winning but all of its proper subsets are losing, then S
is called a minimal winning coalition. Similarly, a losing coalition T whose proper supersets are winning
is called a maximal losing coalition. A simple game is more compactly characterized by its set Wm of
minimal winning coalitions than by the corresponding set W of winning coalitions (or, equivalently, by its
set LM of maximal losing coalitions rather than the set L of all losing coalitions).
Players of a simple game can often be ranked according to their ‘influence’ or ‘desirability’. Namely, if
v(S ∪{i}) ≥ v(S ∪{j}) for players i, j ∈ N and all S ⊆ N\{i, j} then we write i ⊐ j (or j ⊏ i) and say
that player i is at least as influential as player j. The case i ⊐ j and j ⊐ i is denoted as i j; we then say
that both players are equivalent. The -relation partitions the set of players into equivalence classes. It is
possible that neither i ⊐ j nor j ⊐ i holds, i.e., players may be incomparable. A simple game v is called
complete if the binary relation ⊐ is complete, i.e., i ⊐ j or j ⊐ i for all i, j ∈ N . Complete simple games
form a proper subclass of simple games.
Given a complete simple game v, a minimal winning coalition S is called shift-minimal winning if
S\{i} ∪ {j} is losing for all i ∈ S and all j ∈ N\S with i ⊐ j but not i j, i.e., S would become
losing if any of its players i were replaced by a strictly less influential player j. Similarly, a maximal
losing coalition T is called shift-maximal losing if T \{i} ∪ {j} is winning for all i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S
with j ⊐ i but not i j. A complete simple game is most compactly characterized by the partition of
the players into equivalence classes and a description of either the shift-minimal winning or shift-maximal
losing coalitions.
If there exist weights wi ∈ R≥0 for all i ∈ N and a quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 iff w(S) :=∑
i∈S wi ≥ q for all coalitions S ⊆ N then we call the simple game v weighted. Every weighted game
is complete but the converse is false. We call the vector (q, w1, . . . , wn) a representation of v and write
v = [q;w1, . . . , wn]. If v is weighted, there also exist representations such that all weights and the quota
are integers. If
∑n
i=1 wi is minimal with respect to the integrality constraint, we speak of a minimum sum
integer representation (see, e.g., [10]).
If v1, v2 are weighted games with identical player set N and respective sets of winning coalitions W1
and W2 then the winning coalitions of v1 ∧ v2 are given by W1 ∩W2. The smallest number k such that a
simple game v coincides with the intersection v1∧ . . .∧vk of k weighted games with identical player set is
called the dimension of v. Similarly, the winning coalitions of v1∨v2 areW1∪W2, and the smallest number
of weighted games whose union v1 ∨ . . . ∨ vk coincides with a simple game v is the co-dimension of v.
Freixas and Puente have shown that there exists a complete simple game with dimension k for every integer
k [7]. It is not known yet whether the dimension of a complete simple game is polynomially bounded in
the number of its players or can grow exponentially (like for general simple games).
Lemma 1. (cf. [14, Theorem 1.7.2]) The dimension of a simple game v is bounded above by ∣∣LM ∣∣ and the
co-dimension is bounded above by |Wm|.
Proof. For each coalition S ∈ LM we set qS = 1, wSi = 0 for all i ∈ S and wSi = 1 otherwise. Note that
LM 6= ∅ since ∅ is a losing coalition. With this wS(S) = 0 < qS . However, for all T ⊆ N with T 6⊆ S
we have w(T ) ≥ 1 = qS . Thus, we have v =
∧
S∈LM
[
qS ;wS1 , . . . , w
S
n
]
. Similarly, for each S ∈ Wn
we set q˜S = |S|, w˜Si = 1 for all i ∈ S and wSi = 0 otherwise. Note that Wm 6= ∅ since N is a winning
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# Member state Population w2 # Member state Population w2
1 Germany 80 780 000 4 659 052 16 Bulgaria 7 245 677 417 900
2 France 65 856 609 3 798 333 17 Denmark 5 627 235 324 556
3 United Kingdom 64 308 261 3 709 031 18 Finland 5 451 270 314 406
4 Italy 60 782 668 3 505 689 19 Slovakia 5 415 949 312 369
5 Spain 46 507 760 2 682 373 20 Ireland 4 604 029 265 541
6 Poland 38 495 659 2 220 268 21 Croatia 4 246 700 244 932
7 Romania 19 942 642 1 150 208 22 Lithuania 2 943 472 169 767
8 Netherlands 16 829 289 970 643 23 Slovenia 2 061 085 118 875
9 Belgium 11 203 992 646 199 24 Latvia 2 001 468 115 436
10 Greece 10 992 589 634 006 25 Estonia 1 315 819 75 890
11 Czech Republic 10 512 419 606 312 26 Cyprus 858 000 49 486
12 Portugal 10 427 301 601 403 27 Luxembourg 549 680 31 703
13 Hungary 9 879 000 569 780 28 Malta 425 384 24 535
14 Sweden 9 644 864 556 276
15 Austria 8 507 786 490 693 Total 507 416 607 2 9265 662
TABLE 1. EU population 01.01.2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat); minimum sum inte-
ger weights of v2
coalition. With this w˜S(S) = q˜S . However, for all T ⊆ N with S 6⊆ T we have w(T ) < q˜S . Thus, we
have v =
∨
S∈Wm
[
q˜S ; w˜S1 , . . . , w˜
S
n
]
. 
Let Φ = {u1, . . . , uk} be a set of weighted games, interpreted as Boolean variables, and let ϕ be a
monotone Boolean formula over Φ, i.e., a well-formed formula of propositional logic over Φ which uses
parentheses and the operators∧ and∨ only. The size |ϕ| of formulaϕ is the number of variable occurrences,
i.e., the number of ∧ and ∨ operators plus one. For instance, the size of u1 ∨ (u1 ∧ u2) is 3.
Definition 1. The Boolean dimension of a simple game v is the smallest integer m such that there ex-
ist k ≤ m weighted games u1, . . . , uk and a monotone Boolean formula ϕ of size |ϕ| = m satisfying
ϕ(u1, . . . , uk) = v.
Clearly, the Boolean dimension of v is at most the minimum of v’s dimension and co-dimension. Be-
cause combinations of ∧ with ∨ have a size of at least 3, the Boolean dimension must exceed 2 whenever
the dimension and co-dimension do. The dimension can be exponential in the Boolean dimension of a
simple game [4, Thm. 4]; the Boolean dimension of a simple game can be exponential in the number of
players [4, Cor. 2].
3. LISBON VOTING RULES IN EU COUNCIL
We now formalize the provisions (i)–(iii) for decision making by the EU Council (see Sec. 1). The mem-
bership requirement (i) – approval of at least 16 = ⌈0.55 · 28⌉ member states – is easily reflected by the
weighted game v1 = [16; 1, . . . , 1]. The population requirement (ii) could be represented by using the offi-
cial population counts as weights and 65% of the total population as quota (see Table 1). Its computationally
more convenient minimum sum integer representation is given by v2 = [q;w2] with q = 19 022 681 and
the weights indicated in the w2-columns of Table 1.1 The additional minimal blocking requirement (iii)
can be described as v3 = [25; 1, . . . , 1], since 28 − 4 + 1 = 25 member states suffice to pass a proposal.
The Lisbon voting rule of the EU Council is then formally characterized as vEU28 = (v1 ∧ v2) ∨ v3 or
vEU28 = v1 ∧ (v2 ∨ v3).
The 268 435 456 coalitions of vEU28 are partitioned into 30 340 718 winning and 238 094 738 losing
coalitions. Of these, 8 248 125 are minimal winning and 7 179 233 maximal losing. So the dimension of
vEU28 must be below 7.18 millions.
1We remark that rounding populations to, say, thousands is common in applied work because this simplifies computations, e.g., of
the voting power distribution in the EU Council. Rounding, however, leads to a different set of winning coalitions, i.e., is analyzing
‘wrong’ rules.
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The influence partition of the Boolean combination of weighted games generally corresponds to the
coarsest common refinement of the respective partitions in the constituent games. Here, there is only a
single equivalence class of players in v1 and v3, respectively, while v2 has 28 equivalence classes (all
minimum sum weights differ by at least 2). So each player forms its own equivalence class in vEU28. There
are only 60 607 shift-minimal winning and 60 691 shift-maximal losing coalitions in vEU28.2
4. WEIGHTEDNESS AND BOUNDING STRATEGY
Determining whether a given simple game is weighted or not will be crucial for our analysis of vEU28.
Answers can be given by combinatorial, algebraic or geometric methods (see [14, Ch. 2]). We will draw
on the first two.
Combinatorial techniques usually invoke so-called ‘trades’. A trading transform for a simple game v
is a collection of coalitions J = 〈S1, . . . , Sj;T1, . . . , Tj〉 such that |{h : i ∈ Sh}| = |{h : i ∈ Th}| for all
i ∈ N . An m-trade for v is a trading transform with j ≤ m such that all Sh are winning and all Th are
losing coalitions. Existence of, say, a 2-trade 〈S1, S2;T1, T2〉 implies that the game cannot be weighted:
w(S1), w(S2) ≥ q and w(T1), w(T2) < q would contradict w(S1)+w(S2) = w(T1)+w(T2). The simple
game v is called m-trade robust if no m-trade exists for it. Taylor and Zwicker have shown that a simple
game is weighted iff it is m = 22n -trade robust (see, e.g., [14, Thm. 2.4.2]). Sharper bounds for m have
been provided by [8], but the lower one is still linear and the upper exponential in n.
Example 1. Consider the complete simple game v with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and
LM =
{
{1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 6}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 6}, {2, 4, 5}, {2, 4, 6}
}
.
All coalitions in LM are also shift-maximal losing, but only coalitions {1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4} and
{3, 4, 5, 6} of
Wm =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 4}, {3, 4, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 5, 6}, {1, 4, 5, 6}, {2, 3, 5, 6}, {2, 4, 5, 6}
}
are also shift-minimal winning. Since
〈{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6}; {1, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 6}〉
is a 2-trade, v is not weighted.3
Algebraic methods exploit that a simple game v is weighted iff the inequality system
∑
i∈S wi ≥
q ∀S ∈ Wm,
∑
i∈T wi ≤ q − 1 ∀T ∈ L
M, wi ∈ R≥0 ∀i ∈ N, and q ∈ R≥1 admits a solution. Linear
programming (LP) techniques can be applied. In case that no solution exists, the dual multipliers provide
a certificate of non-weightedness. A suitable subset of the constraints – those for the minimal winning and
some maximal losing coalitions, say – often suffice to conclude infeasibility and thus non-weightedness.
For a complete simple game v with sets Wsm and LsM of shift-minimal winning and shift-maximal
losing coalitions, the linear inequality system can further be simplified. Namely, v is weighted iff
(1)
∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q ∀S ∈ W
sm,
∑
i∈T
wi ≤ q − 1 ∀T ∈ L
sM,
wi ≥ wj ∈ R≥0 ∀i, j ∈ N with i ⊐ j, wi ∈ R≥0 ∀i ∈ N and q ∈ R≥1
admits a solution. Note that non-weightedness of v says no more about v’s dimension than that it exceeds
1.
One might hope that it is possible to construct a representation of a complete simple game v as the
intersection of
∣∣LsM ∣∣weighted games as follows: look at one coalition Tl ∈ LsM at a time; find a weighted
game vl such that (a) vl(Tl) = 0 and (b) vl(S) = 1 for every S ∈ Wsm by ignoring all constraints∑
i∈T ′ wi ≤ q−1 in system (1) for T ′ ∈ LsM \Tl; finally obtain v1∧ . . .∧v|LsM | as a representation of v.
Unfortunately, this does not work in general. For instance, we can infer from infeasibility of w1 +w2 ≥ q,
w3 + w4 + w5 + w6 ≥ q, w1 + w3 + w5 ≤ q − 1, w1 = w2, w3 = w4 and w5 = w6 that there
exists no weighted game v1 which respects the ordering condition wi ≥ wj ⇐⇒ i ⊐ j and in which
T1 = {1, 3, 5} ∈ L
sM is losing and (at least) {1, 2} and {3, 4, 5, 6} are winning (see Example 1). Counter-
examples exist also when no two players are equivalent. The basic idea of this heuristic construction is still
2For example, every 16-member winning coalition is minimal but few are also shift-minimal.
3The example is the smallest possible: all complete simple games with n ≤ 5 are weighted.
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useful, and will be applied in order to provide an upper bound on vEU28’s dimension. In order to establish
a lower bound, we will use
Observation 1. Given a simple game v with winning coalitions W and losing coalitions L, let L′ =
{T1, . . . , Tk} ⊆ L be a set of losing coalitions with the following ‘pairwise incompatibility property’: for
each pair {Ti, Tj} with Ti 6= Tj ∈ L′ there exists no weighted game in which all coalitions in W are
winning while Ti and Tj are both losing. Then if v =
∧
1≤l≤m vl is the intersection of m weighted games,
we must have m ≥ k, i.e., v’s dimension is at least k.
The observation generalizes the construction used in [5]. A quick way to establish that there is no
weighted game with Ti and Tj losing and all S ∈ W winning is to find a 2-trade 〈S1, S2;Ti, Tj〉 for some
S1, S2 ∈ W . Not finding a 2-trade does not guarantee that such weighted game exists; and checking for
3-trades, 4-trades, etc. gets computationally demanding. However, in order to provide a lower bound k for
vEU28’s dimension, it suffices to provide any set L′ of k pairwise incompatible losing coalitions. So one
can focus on sets in which 2-trades are easily obtained for all
(
k
2
)
pairs, and improve the resulting bound
by extending L′ if needed.
We remark that it is possible to formulate the exact determination of the dimension of a simple game
as a discrete optimization problem. To this end let C collect all subsets S ⊆ LM with the property
that there exists a weighted game where all elements of W are winning and all elements of S are los-
ing. In particular, all singleton subsets of LM are contained in C (cf. proof of Lemma 1); so is, e.g.,
{{1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 6}, {1, 4, 5}, {1, 4, 6}} in Example 1, but not {{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 6}}.
Having constructed C, the dimension of v can be determined by finding a minimal covering of LM ,
using the elements of C. Specifically, v’s dimension is the optimal value of min
∑
S∈C xS subject to the
constraints
∑
S∈C:T∈S xS ≥ 1 for all T ∈ LM and xS ∈ {0, 1} for all S ∈ C. However, this set covering
formulation is, in general, computationally intractable. For vEU28, already the construction of C is out of
reach because LM has more than 27.1·106 subsets. We hence have to contend ourselves with lower and
upper bounds which may be brought to identity at some point in the future.
5. BOUNDS FOR vEU28 ’S DIMENSION
Since vEU28 has so many maximal losing coalitions we have focused our search for a suitable set L′
of pairwise incompatible losing coalitions on the subset L23,24 ⊂ L of losing coalitions with 23 or 24
members. They fail the 65% population and 25 member thresholds. For each pair of these 4 533 coalitions
we have performed a greedy search for a 2-trade. Specifically, let two such losing coalitions Ti 6= Tj ∈
L23,24 be given, set I = Ti∩Tj , and then extend I to a winning coalition S1 with 25 members by choosing
the least populous elements of (Ti ∪ Tj) \I . Coalition S2 is then defined by ((Ti ∪ Tj) \S1) ∪ I . If S2 is
winning, we have found a 2-trade, i.e., pair {Ti, Tj} satisfies the incompatibility criterion. Marking this
occurrence as an edge in a graph G with vertex set L23,24, we can perform a clique search on G. It turns out
that G contains 24 452 800 cliques of size 6 but no larger clique. One of the 6-cliques corresponds to L′ ={
{1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28},
{1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28}
}
.4
This 6-clique is actually the most robust one regarding changes of the relative population distribution
in the EU: it is not upset by moves between states, births, or deaths as long as the new relative population
vector pop′ and the old one, pop, based on Table 1, have a ‖ · ‖1-distance less than 0.0095. This distance
could accommodate arbitrary moves of up to 2.5 million EU citizens. The robustness is noteworthy because
high numbers in the minimum sum representation of v2 indicate that vEU28 is rather sensitive to population
changes.
4Just to give an example,
〈
{4, . . . , 28}, {1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, . . . , 28}; {1, 4, 5, 7, . . . , 12,
14, . . . , 28}, {3, . . . , 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, . . . , 28}
〉
is a 2-trade for the first two losing coalitions.
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The above set L′ can be extended, without affecting robustness, by adding the maximal losing coalition
{1, . . . , 15} of the 15 largest member states, which was excluded by the initial focus on L23,24. This
establishes:
Proposition 1. Let v be the simple game arising from vEU28 by replacing the underlying relative population
vector pop by the relative population vector pop′. If ‖pop− pop′‖1 ≤ 0.95% then v has dimension at least
7.
An alternative for establishing a lower bound d for vEU28’s dimension is to replace the graph-theoretic
search for 2-trades by a straightforward integer linear program (ILP) such as5
max∆ s.t.
28∑
i=1
l
j
i ≤ 24 ∀1≤j≤d,
28∑
i=1
popi · l
j
i ≤ 0.65−∆ ∀1≤j≤d
28∑
i=1
w
j,h,1
i ≥ 25 ∀1≤j<h ≤d,
28∑
i=1
popi · w
j,h,2
i ≥ 0.65 + ∆ ∀1≤j<h≤ d
l
j
i+l
h
i = w
j,h,1
i +w
j,h,2
i ∀1≤ i≤28, 1≤j<h≤d, l
j
i ∈{0, 1} ∀1≤ i≤28, 1≤j≤d
28∑
i=1
w
j,h,2
i ≥16 ∀1≤j<h ≤d, w
j,h,k
i ∈{0, 1} ∀1≤ i≤28, 1≤j<h≤d, k∈{1, 2}.
This turned out to be impractical for d > 6 but has yielded a simple, robust certificate for d = 3, which
will be useful for obtaining Corollary 1 below:
Proposition 2. Let v be the simple game arising from vEU28 by replacing the underlying population vector
pop by the relative population vector pop′. If ‖pop− pop′‖1 ≤ 2.19% then v has dimension at least 3.
Proof. Three losing coalitions whose pairs can be completed to a 2-trade are:
{1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, . . . , 14, 16, . . . , 26, 28}, {3, . . . , 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, . . . , 24, 26, 27}, and
{2, 4, . . . , 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, . . . , 20, 22, . . . , 25, 27, 28}.

In order to bring down the baseline upper bound of
∣∣LM ∣∣ ≈ 7.18 mio. for vEU28’s dimension (Lemma 1),
we draw on LP formulation (1) and the indicated idea to check for each Tl ∈ LsM whether inequality
system (1) with LsM replaced by {Tl} has a feasible solution. This yields weighted games for 57 869 out
of
∣∣LsM ∣∣ = 60 691 coalitions. The remaining 2 822 stubborn shift-maximal losing coalitions correspond
to exactly 17 003 maximal losing coalitions, which are not yet covered by the identified weighted games.
We could apply the construction in the proof of Lemma 1 to these and would obtain an upper bound of
74 872.
This, however, is easily improved by the following procedure: (I) try to greedily cover many shift-
maximal losing coalitions with a few selected weighted games; (II) find a weighted game vj for each still
uncovered and non-stubbornTj ∈ LsM ; (III) deal with the maximal losing coalitions related to all stubborn
Tk. We utilized the following ILP in order to iteratively find helpful games in step (I)
max
∑
T∈L′′
xT s.t. xT ∈ {0, 1}∀T ∈ L′′, wi ≥ wi+1 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 27,
28∑
i=1
wi ≤M,
∑
i∈S
wi ≥ q ∀S ∈ W
sm,
∑
i∈T
wi ≤ q−1+(1−xT)M,wi, q ∈ N ∀1≤ i≤28.
This ILP exploits that 1 ⊐ . . . ⊐ 28 in vEU28, the constant M is chosen so as to give integer weights with
suitable magnitude (e.g., thousands), and L′′ is the part of LsM which is still uncovered or a subset thereof.
It is possible, for instance, to cover 34 323 shift-maximal losing coalitions in step (I) with just 10 weighted
games. Adding more weighted games to these, the lowest upper bound which we have obtained so far is
13 368. The games and a checking tool can be obtained from the authors.
5For the general ILP modeling of weighted games we refer to [11].
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All of these considerations can easily be translated to the co-dimension. There, we have to consider
unions of weighted games, where all coalitions in LM are losing and the winning coalitions in Wm end up
being covered by a suitable selection of constituent games. We skip the details for space reasons.
Proposition 3. Let v be the simple game arising from vEU28 by replacing the underlying relative population
vector pop by the relative population vector pop′. If ‖pop− pop′‖1 ≤ 5% then v has co-dimension at least
7.
Proof. Seven winning coalitions whose pairs can be completed to a 2-trade are:
{2, . . . , 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, . . . , 15, 17, . . . , 20}, {1, 2, 3, 6, 8, . . . , 15, 17, 18, 19, 25},
{1, 3, 5, . . . , 16, 19, 20} {1, 2, 5, . . . , 17, 22}, {1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, . . . , 15, 19, 23, 24, 26},
{1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 16, 18, 20, 21}, and {1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, . . . , 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 28}. 
The combination of Propositions 2 and 3 yields:
Corollary 1. Let v be the simple game arising from vEU28 by replacing the underlying relative population
vector pop by the relative population vector pop′. If ‖pop−pop′‖1 ≤ 2.19% then v has Boolean dimension
exactly 3.
We remark that is not too hard to determine 2 000 winning coalitions such that each pair can be com-
pleted to a 2-trade. So the co-dimension of vEU28 with populations exactly as in Table 1 is at least 2 000.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Simple game v3 rules out that three of the EU’s “Big Four” (see Table 1) can cast a veto in the Council.
This has very minor consequences for the mapping of different voting configurations to a collective “yes”
or “no”: the disjunction with v3 adds a mere 10 to the 30 340 708 coalitions which are already winning
in v1 ∧ v2. Prima facie, provision (iii) should therefore have only symbolic influence on the distribution
of voting power in the Council.6 Quite surprisingly, however, provision (iii) has tremendous effect on the
conjunctive dimensionality of the rules. Namely, the EU Council sets a new world record, among the
political institutions that we know of: the dimension of its decision rule is at least 7.
The link to classical set covering problems in optimization which we have identified and partly exploited
in Sections 4 and 5 implies that there exist algorithms which should – at least in theory – terminate with
an answer to the simple question: what is the dimension of vEU28? In practice, heuristic methods which
establish and improve bounds are needed. The suggested mix of combinatorial and algebraic techniques,
integer linear programming and graph-theoretic methods has rather general applicability. It also lends itself
to robustness considerations, which we hope will become more popular in the literature. (A potentially
negative referendum on EU membership in the UK and a consequent exit, for instance, would leave our
lower bounds intact.)
The drawback of our relatively general approach is that the resultant upper bound of 13 368 is still pretty
high; the record lower bound of 7 may not be the final word either. Alternative approaches, which might
use unexploited specifics of vEU28, will potentially lead to much sharper boundaries in the future.
The certification of better dimension bounds is a problem which we would here like to advertise to
the optimization community. The application of meta-heuristics, such as simulated annealing and genetic
algorithms, or column generation techniques could be promising. The ultimate challenge is, of course, to
determine the exact dimension of the group decision rule in the EU Council.
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